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TALK TITLE: 
 
“An Elusive Dream? Religious Freedom & the reign of God” 
 
PRESENTER: 
 
Anthony E. Clark, Ph.D., Edward B. Lindaman Endowed Chair in Chinese History  
(Whitworth University) 
 
TIME & LOCATION: 
 
Thursday, 24 September 2015 
7:00 pm – 8:00 pm 
Weyerhaeuser Hall Robinson Hall Teaching Theatre (RTT) 
 
ABSTRACT: 
 
This first public lecture as Lindaman Endowed Chair shall center on the topics of 
religious freedom and the reign of God, which at first appear to be contradictory ideas. 
How can the human person be truly free while also being confined to obedience to God’s 
will and design for Creation? The talk will explore Christian understandings of the reign 
of God in a world seemingly torn apart by sectarianism and religious difference, focusing 
on the historical legacy of China vis-à-vis religious freedom and the putative separation 
of Church and State. 
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TALK: 
 
• Thank you to Dr. Simon for your kind introduction, and thank you to my 
colleagues and students here at Whitworth for helping create a scholarly and 
spiritual atmosphere that encourages spirited intellectual engagement within a 
context where faith remains an important component of the academic project. 
• Also, I should say at the outset that my remarks tonight might appear to follow 
several unrelated strands, but I assure you that whatever I unravel over the next 45 
minutes is part of the same ball of yarn. When I first moved to Spokane seven 
years ago I attended an Indian sitar concert, and the performer warned that the 
sitar travels to seemingly unrelated directions, but that in the end the music 
coalesces into more unified melodic stream. “Bear with the journey,” he said, “all 
will come together in the end.” So, please bear with my intellectual sitar concert 
tonight – “all will come together in the end.” 
• The topic of my talk was inspired by an experience I recently had in China. While 
visiting a church in Beijing I noticed a groundskeeper tenderly watering a small 
patch of grass beneath a large tree; it was the best-kept spot on the church 
property. Naturally, I asked him why. He told me that during the summer of 1966, 
the beginning of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) a crowd of Maoist Red 
Guards surrounded the church and dragged the 80-year-old Chinese priest to the 
spot beneath the tree. They shouted at the priest: “You are have no right to spread 
your false religion! You have no right deceive the people!” The priest responded 
with something like, “But God is the one with true rights.” They began to torture 
the old man, demanding that he abandon his faith in God. The old priest refused, 
so he was buried alive while he intoned prayers at the spot where the grass has 
remained preserved as a commemoration of the reign of God. 
• I should also acknowledge here that I am aware of the growing and unrelenting 
religious intolerance occurring in the Middle East today, intolerance that 
continues to displace and take the lives of countless persons under the injudicious 
banner of the “reign of God.” I will not be discussing these atrocities tonight 
because such actions begin in the realm of ideas – so, I’ll confine my remarks to 
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ideas so that we might better frame how we envision religious freedom and the 
reign of God. Ideas are the engine of human action, and greed as much as 
religious radicalism can compel persons to control and confine the religious 
beliefs and practices of others. Our own wealth-obsessed culture often appears to 
prioritize wealth above goodness. Socrates, as quoted by Plato, once exclaimed 
that, “Wealth does not bring goodness, but goodness brings wealth, and every 
other blessing, both to the individual and to the state.”1 Ideas matter, whether they 
motivate cruelness based on religious belief or cruelness based on greed. 
 
Introduction 
 
 I would like to begin my first talk as the Edward Lindaman Chair by conjuring 
two somber dichotomies in an effort to critique how we think in modern society. And 
then I would like to make some surprising turns into Western philosophy, ancient China, 
Christian dogmatics, and modern China, and conclude with some remarks about religious 
freedom and the reign of God in our personal lives and the world in general. I won’t 
explicitly confront many of what present society considers “pressing issues,” such as 
race, gender, and sexual identity, because all of these questions are best scrutinized after 
we have grown better acquainted with God’s will. I will, however, admit one perhaps 
controversial argument: I do not support the ideal of separating Church from State, as it is 
imagined today, for if God is indeed the ruler of all creation, then it is foolish to remove 
him from the rule of any government. That said, I am not naïve to the conundrums 
precipitated by radical theocratic dictatorships, but such governments are not Christ-like, 
which would render them more merciful and chartable. A sure sign that a government has 
grown distant from the Creator is that it has become destructive rather than creative. 
 To the dichotomies: First, the Genevan Enlightenment philosopher, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau (1712-1778), opened his work, Du Contrat Social (The Social Contract, 1775) 
with the assertion that, “Man is born free; and is everywhere in chains.”2 And second, 
among Raphael’s (1483-1520) most famous paintings are his “School of Athens,” which 
valorizes human genius, and his “Disputation on the Eucharist,” which celebrates the 
insights of faith. When I hear others discussing this remark by Rousseau it is almost 
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always in the context of human potential – attained or suppressed – and when I visit 
Raphael’s paintings in Rome I see large crowds in adoration of the “School of Athens,” 
while I alone look at his depiction of faith. We humans love ourselves, and we seem little 
predisposed to surrender our apparent freedom, the freedom to attain to our own desires, 
for the less apparent freedom of what we can assent to without an evident assurance of 
personal gain and liberation. The reality of evidence has replaced in our current society 
the evidence of reason. Said another way, whereas Aristotle argues that humans are by 
nature rational beings, Rousseau’s anthropology has inverted this assumption, suggesting 
that we are not rational creatures, but are rather the makers of our own purpose. As Allan 
Bloom (1930-1992) echoes Rousseau’s ideas, “There are no ends, only possibilities.”3  
Rousseau denies Aristotle’s insistence on a teleology, that there is a purpose and 
aim for all things, and has made human desire and the individual ascent of the will 
dominant over any external law, such as the rule of God. Putting a Cartesian spin on 
Rousseau, we might describe his philosophy as an exclamation that, I feel therefore I am, 
and the better we feel the better we are. So, as I now turn to the the dichotomy of human 
freedom and the reign of God, we must first admit, I believe, that we are living in a 
Rousseauian age; still largely in the wake of Rousseau and the Enlightenment, it is 
painfully difficult for most of us to imagine surrendering our conditioned desire for 
freedom to the reign of God, whose reign comes with laws and a purpose-driven 
teleology that might require us to change course . . . and even change our minds. 
Voltaire’s (1694-1778) reaction to Rousseau represents a better strand of Enlightenment 
thinking. When Rousseau sent to Voltaire a copy of one of his publications in 1754, 
Voltaire replied in a letter: “No one has ever used so much intelligence to persuade us to 
be so stupid.”4 Voltaire was unwilling to allow Rousseau’s philosophy of feelings to 
supplant his own philosophy of reason. 
 
Truth and Taming the Floodwaters 
 
I anticipate some will react to my support of Aristotle and Voltaire’s resistance to 
Rousseau with the question: “How can one be certain of what, precisely, is the aim and 
law of our lives?” And even more, “How can one be certain that her or his interpretation 
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of God’s will is the true interpretation?” Inevitably, most discussions of God’s will and 
aim revolve around the knotty philosophical puzzle of defining and discerning truth; but 
I’ll leave a more protracted consideration of this question to my colleagues in Philosophy. 
A few words from ancient China, however, might help clear a path for engaging the 
subject of religious freedom and the reign of God, and perhaps even the relentless 
question of truth. My scholarly work is in the area of Chinese history, so I hope you’ll 
understand my use of China as a case study for my subject tonight. We might simply ask, 
is it possible to know God’s will for the world, or is the hope of knowing his laws, in the 
end, and elusive dream? Regardless of whether truth is or is not discernible, ancient 
Chinese thinkers understood that there must be some standard by which behavior should 
be measured. In his essay, Tianzhi, 天志 or “The Will of Heaven,” the fifth-century BC 
philosopher, Mozi 墨⼦子(ca. 470-ca. 391 BCE), wrote that: 
. . . if men do not do what Heaven desires, but instead do what Heaven does not 
desire, then Heaven will likewise not do what men desire, but instead do what 
men do not desire. . . . Therefore the sage kings of antiquity sought to understand 
clearly what Heaven and the spirits would bless, and to avoid what Heaven and 
the spirits hate, and this is why they worked to promote what is beneficial to the 
world and eliminate what is harmful.5 
Mozi argues that Heaven, perhaps the closest Chinese notion of a supreme governing 
power, has a normative plan for all existence, and even punishes those who contradict 
that plan. In another passage, he insists that, “The will of heaven is to me like a compass 
to a wheelwright or a square to a carpenter. The wheelwright and the carpenter use their 
compass and square to measure what is round and square for the world, saying, ‘What fits 
these measurements is right; what does not fit them is wrong’.”6 Put more simply, Mozi 
maintained that there does exist a higher law, or measure, by which humans are 
accountable, and by which they are rewarded or punished. 
 Other Chinese thinkers were not so convinced of our actual ability to know the 
difference between round and square. The Daoist philosopher, Zhuangzi (3rd century 
BCE), 莊⼦子 for example, argued that human understanding was more relative. His 
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position on truth is famously illustrated in his passage on dreaming that he is a butterfly. 
Once upon a time Zhuangzi [Zhuang Zhou] dreamed that he was a butterfly, a 
butterfly flitting about happily enjoying himself. He didn’t know that he was 
Zhuangzi [Zhou]. Suddenly he awoke and was palpably Zhuangzi [Zou]. He 
didn’t know whether he was Zhuangzi [Zhou] who had dreamed of being a 
butterfly or a butterfly dreaming that he was Zhuangzi [Zhou].7 
Zhuangzi’s butterfly dream represents China’s highest level of suspicion regarding the 
human ability of apprehending reality, but most people who quote this passage do not 
include what he said next. Immediately after recalling his dream, Zhuangzi asserts that, 
“Between Zhuangzi and the butterfly there is certain to be a distinction; this is called the 
order of things.”8 In other words, even though he is suspicious of our ability to know the 
ultimate truth of reality, he insists that distinctions exist; truth exists. Zhuangzi suggests 
that knowledge is relative, but he is not a Relativist. 
 Mozi held that there is a divine standard by which all must abide and Zhuangzi 
believed that ultimate standards are ultimately unknowable. Neither were particularly 
pragmatic; for a more pragmatic philosophy we must turn to another early Chinese text, 
the Shujing, 書經 or “Book of History.” This work contains a myth of a great flood, Da 
hongshui, ⼤大洪⽔水 which covered vast portions of the earth. The ruler first called upon 
Gun, 鯀 to alleviate the waters, but Gun resisted the nature of water by constructing 
dykes that gave way. Gun’s son, Yu, 禹 however, was more enlightened. Unlike his 
father, Yu examined the nature and laws of the waters and, as the Book of History recalls, 
“opened the passages for the streams throughout the nine provinces, and conducted them 
to the sea.”9 In other words, taming the floodwaters was only possible after Yu learned to 
obey the laws of nature, laws that result in success and failure depending on whether one 
conforms to what is correct and incorrect. 
 To summarize my points so far: China has, until recent centuries, believed in a 
definitive truth, superintended by a divine Heaven, that rewards or punishes those who 
obey or disobey its precepts. To put all this into a Western framework we might turn to 
the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius (121-180 CE), whose ideas were summarized well in 
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Ernst Cassirer’s work on the philosophy of human culture. According the Aurelius, “both 
the universal order and personal order are nothing but different expressions and 
manifestations of a common underlying principle.”10 Freedom, according to both the 
classical Western and Eastern understandings, is not a freedom to follow one’s own 
designs without consequences; for both China and the West there was an understood 
power that monitors and encourages obedience to a divine law. Truth and the taming of 
floodwaters could not be separated without unwanted results.  
 
Religious Freedom and The Kingship of Christ: A Christian View 
 
I’ll return to Rousseau, Aristotle, Mozi, and Zhuangzi in a while, but let’s turn 
now to the question of religious freedom as understood in recent history. In the realm of 
secular thought, the eighteenth-century British (well, actually, Scottish) moral 
philosopher and economist, Adam Smith (1723-1790), was among the early advocates for 
what we now imagine as religious freedom. In his, The Wealth of Nations (1776), Smith 
argues that allowing people to freely practice their own religious tradition promotes two 
salutary benefits in any free society; it helps prevent civil unrest and it moderates 
intolerance. He writes that: 
The interested and active zeal of religious teachers can be dangerous and 
troublesome only where there is either but one sect tolerated in the society, or 
where the whole of a large society is divided into two or three great sects; the 
teachers of each acting by concert, and under a regular discipline and 
subordination.11 
Smith’s concern is not that religions share space on the same national landscape, but that 
religious leaders exert contentious zeal, or that one or two religious traditions dominate 
the other minority belief systems. Smith exemplifies the pragmatic view held by most 
secular societies today, which prioritize social harmony over religious truth. Christians – 
I should say most Christians – attempt to navigate between the understood need for social 
harmony in our present pluralist society and the knowledge that Christianity is the only 
true religious reality. 
 How, then, have Christians traditionally articulated their vision of religious 
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freedom? When the Protestant missionary in China, and professor of History at Nanjing 
University, Miner Searle Bates, published his book, Religious Liberty: An Inquiry, in 
1945, he defined religious freedom in these words: It is an “absence of compulsion or 
restraint.” And in more positive terms, Bates suggests that genuine liberty “requires a 
choice of good aims or objects.” True freedom, he insists, cannot choose to “do what is 
evil.”12 As a Christian, Bates cannot merely support religious freedom as a means to 
attain social harmony, but it must moreover be directed to the good. Freedom, then, is 
confined to the structure of a moral law. The American television personality of the 
1950s, Bishop Fulton Sheen, expressed Bate’s notion of religious freedom in slightly 
different terms. “The center of our being then is not ourselves,” Sheen affirms, “but in 
God; the secret of our freedom then is not in choice but in goodness.”13 Sheen supplants 
the secular notion of freedom as an openness to choices, and places it in its proper 
context, within the context of goodness as willed by God. At the Second Vatican Council, 
the Council Fathers declared that all persons “are to be immune from coercion on the part 
of individuals or of social groups and of any human power, in such wise that no one is to 
be forced to act in a manner contrary to his own beliefs, whether privately or publicly, 
whether alone or in association with others, within due limits.”14 So, religious freedom 
forbids coercion. The Council, however, continues to avow that this principle “leaves 
untouched traditional Catholic doctrine on the moral duty of men and societies toward the 
true religion and toward the one Church of Christ.”15 One might not agree with the 
Catholic doctrine that it is the “one Church of Christ,” but one cannot miss the Council’s 
implication that religious liberty in no way detracts from authentic, even insistent, belief. 
The historical, and consistent, Christian understanding of religious freedom is the 
unrelenting view that religious coercion is never acceptable. Equally unacceptable is the 
position that God’s reign must be attenuated or compromised for the sake of social 
harmony. 
 In Yves Congar’s, OP, (1904-1995) summoning book, Jesus Christ, published in 
1965, he emphasizes forcefully that for Christians there can be no other view than that, 
“The Lordship of Christ is total and absolute.”16 This is, he reminds his reader, 
consistently affirmed in the Old and New Testaments. In addition, Congar recalls that 
God’s reign is connected often to his role as creator. In Colossians 1:16 we read, “For 
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him were created all things in heaven and on earth, the visible and the invisible, whether 
thrones or dominions or principalities or powers; all things were created through him and 
for him.”17 And of Christ’s kingship, Sacred Scripture is replete with examples. 
Revelation 1:8, for example: “ ‘I am the Alpha and the Omega,’ says the Lord God, ‘the 
one who is and who was and who is to come, the almighty’.”18 1 Corinthians 11:3 begins 
with the assertion that, “Christ is the head of every man.”19 And quite strongly, St. Paul’s 
letter to the Romans exclaims, “For this is why Christ died and came to life, that he might 
be Lord of both the dead and the living.”20 The Hebrew Bible, too, repeats this theme. 
Isaiah 33:22, for example, conveys, “The Lord is our judge, the Lord is our lawgiver, the 
Lord is our king.”21 Finally, Jesus himself said to his followers: “Whoever has my 
commandments and observes them is the one who loves me.”22 There is little room, it 
seems, for a Christian adherence to Sacred Scripture without an obedience to God and his 
laws. 
This is perhaps why thinkers such as Jean-Jacqes Rousseau grew increasingly 
distant from the confinements of Christian moral teaching. Roussea was born a Calvinist, 
later rejected Calvinism for Catholicism, and finally rejected Catholicism for what he 
termed a “natural religion,” based on his observations of the natural world. In Rousseau’s 
understanding of “nature,” the imposition of a divine law, such as one imposed on us by 
the God of Jewish and Christian scripture, was the antithesis of his own preferred idea of 
“amour de soi,” a kind of positive self-love, influenced largely by a natural impulse 
toward self-preservation. Surrender to a notion such as the kingship of Christ was, 
according to Rousseau, a forfeiture of the kingship of humanity, which was one of the 
calling cards of the French Revolution (1789-1799). To return to Yves Congar: Congar’s 
theology of the reign of God, which he placed above the sophisms of the French 
Revolution, can be summarized in one of his central assertions: “Christ, our Leader, is 
enthroned in heaven, at the right hand of the Father. He reigns here below in the Church, 
but his kingship is still disputed on earth, ‘until God has put his enemies under his 
feet’.”23 While Christ is indeed the divine ruler over all creation, the world, as Congar 
continues, “is in ignorance of the Lordship of Christ and more or less seriously resists 
it.”24 This complex matrix of ideas contends human freedom against religious freedom 
and human kingship against divine kingship. It might help at this point if I back away 
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from these debates for a moment and offer an example of how creation suffers when 
humanity places itself above the Creator. 
 
Religious Freedom and the Co-Creative Duty of Humans Toward Creation 
 
 Among the clearest thinkers about human freedom from a Christian point of view 
is the Greek Orthodox theologian, Metropolitan John Zizioulas. In one of his essays, he 
engages the contradictory nature of contemporary ideas of human freedom, interrogating 
the now common belief that one should be “free” to choose his or her continued 
existence. He recalls hearing a young person exclaim, “No one ever asked me whether I 
wanted to be born.” Zizioulas writes, “we believe that we must be able to choose between 
two or more options, and we must have our say at every step of life.”25 Put another way, 
he recognizes that modern persons define “freedom” as the ability to say yes or no to a 
given choice, even regarding ones own existence. Zizioulas calls out the reckless logic of 
such an idea: “. . . you cannot say ‘no’ to your own existence, or if you could you would 
cease to exist and your freedom would disappear with you.”26 Simply said, we are not 
ultimaty free to make any decision, for choosing non-existence, as a “free act,” is to 
necessarily eliminate freedom which relies upon being in a state of existence. What 
concerns Zizioulas, and me, even more than unreasoned notions of freedom, are the 
frightening results of the abuse of human freedom, especially on our environment. To be 
blunt, I suggest that human freedom, as we employ it, has become a threat to creation. 
 Zizioulas speaks of humans as “created with freedom,” and humanity may set 
itself “for the world or against it.”27 Rather than interpreting humanity’s “dominion over 
the earth” as a mandate to rule over creation, Zizioulas asserts that this implies that 
human persons are rather “made responsible for it.”28 He relates this statement to the 
assertion in Genesis 1:26 that humans were created in the image and likeness of God. The 
early Church Fathers interpreted this in several ways, but one of the dominant views was 
that, as Zizioulas puts it, “Man will of course wish to create his own world, analogous to 
the way that God creates.”29 What separates humans from animals, according to an 
Eastern Christian point of view, is not that we are aware of our own existence and 
animals are not – this appears to be true of animals as it is of humans, though to a lesser 
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degree – but that, Zizioulas insists, “An animal cannot create a world of its own; this is 
only a possibility and a temptation for man.”30 
One of the significant ways that we are “like” God, then, is that we, too, share 
God’s ability to create, the difference being that we cannot create from nothing as God 
can. The privileged human position as, in a fashion, co-creator, produces not only a rich 
potential for wholesome human creation on earth, but also affords humanity the freedom 
to distort this privilege and threaten the creation with which we have all been entrusted. 
As Zizioulas expresses this idea, “To demonstrate his freedom man can either deface the 
world until perhaps he eventually destroys it, or he can take it and affirm it of his own 
free will.”31 Properly understood from a Christian view, freedom should only be 
exercised properly confined to God’s will and design. Among the most alarming 
problems today, as I see it, is that humanity has placed its own desires above God’s 
intended purpose, and the creature has largely rebelled against the Creator. Zizioulas 
laments, and I share his lament, “It is particularly crucial to say this now that we really 
have become a threat to our natural environment as a whole.”32 An important element of 
genuine religious freedom, then, is the co-creative duty of humans toward creation. 
 
Back to China: Religious Freedom in a State of State Rule 
 
 I’ve spoken so far largely about moral freedom and the reign of God, which is an 
inseparable component of religious freedom, but the center of my interest here is really 
on religious freedom. So, I’ll now return to China as a venue for exploring this subject. 
China has strayed far from its early notion of a divine law, by which humanity measures 
its behavior as right or wrong, and by which it is judged and rewarded or punished. 
Zhuangzi’s distrust of ontological or hermeneutical certainty has also been discarded for 
the vicissitudes of political ideologies that valorize state jurisdiction over even the 
slightest possibility of a divine purpose. To safeguard the state’s control of religious 
belief while retaining a patina of tolerance, China’s constitution is carefully articulated. 
Article thirty-six of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China asserts: “No state 
organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not to 
believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do 
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not believe in, any religion. The state protects normal religious activities.”33 In other 
words, religious freedom is predicated on the laws of the state, and no other entity, and 
empowers state officials, who have an admitted agenda to eradicate religious belief, to 
discern what religious beliefs are “normal.” Whereas America culturally submits itself to 
majority vote, as if truth or God were swayed by majority vote, China enforces the state’s 
vision of social harmony by means of constitutional decrees formulated by a single party 
and a small number of invested party members. Christians have intellectually struggled 
with such a paradigm, for if governments are afforded such “rights,” what, then, are the 
rights of God? China’s officials have accurately perceived the inevitable antagonism 
between secular states and Christians, even if some Christians ignore those oppositions.  
Sacred Scripture affirms God’s authority over all human agencies, even those 
endowed with political power. More than once we are told in Scripture that Jesus Christ 
is the “ruler over all the kings of the earth.”34 Clearly, the dilemma for China’s officials is 
to on the one hand allow for what it declares to be “religious freedom,” while knowing 
that some religions, such as Christianity, affirm quite clearly that God’s reign eclipses the 
whims of any state, and even any majority. Medias, majorities, trends, and tyrants are 
ultimately powerless, according to Scripture, to change or even reinterpret God’s reign, 
and freedom to choose one’s contrived or desired reality over the one created by God is, 
in the end, folly. At this point I should state my position clearly: From an authentic 
Christian point of view there is no religious freedom without an underlying understanding 
that while no-one should be coerced into believing in Christianity, there is always present 
the reign of God, whose laws arbitrate all material and spiritual reality. In his encyclical, 
Libertas Humana, or “On the Nature of Human Freedom,” Pope Leo XIII (1810-1903) 
wrote: 
The binding force of human laws is in this, that they are to be regarded as 
applications of the eternal law, as in the principle of all law. . . . Where a law is 
enacted contrary to reason, or to the eternal law, or to some ordinance of God, 
obedience is unlawful, lest, while obeying man, we become disobedient to God.35 
I do not intend to pit humanity against God; such an understanding of the relationship 
between Creator and creature would be distorted. The aim of Leo XIII’s assertion is to 
suggest an appropriate hierarchy of obediences, placing God’s reign above human reign, 
 13 
inasmuch as human reign contradicts God’s intentions. When the Maoist Red Guards 
“struggled against” the 80-year-old Chinese priest in Beijing in 1966, they held a 
distorted view of human freedom. Without recourse to God’s Word and will, the priest’s 
insistence on the reign of God was a threat to their own radical adherence to a contrived 
ontological reality, one that located human will above divine will. The priest’s voice was 
too uncomfortable for them, so it was silenced beneath several under layers of soil. The 
apparent rivalry between religious freedom and the reign of God remains an enduring 
challenge to the intellectual project of our time, which seeks to dismantle such rivalries 
by declaring them constructed. 
 When Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) attacked the work of Claude Lévi-Strauss 
(1908-2009), calling it little more than “bricolage,” he called into scrutiny the human 
ability to settle upon ultimate truths as nothing more than contrivances that are pre-
conditioned by the limits of our language. “The limits of our language,” Ludwig 
Wittgenstein (1889-1951) argued, “is the limits of our world.” And when Michel 
Foucault (1926-1984) and his followers reduced all human reality to two fundamental 
positions, the empowered and those resisting power, he deliberately or non-deliberately 
relegated all religious claims to mechanisms of self-empowerment, not unlike 
Nietzsche’s notion of the “will to power.” I admit that these currents of thought can be 
useful tools of analysis, but no matter their intellectual force, they do nothing to change 
the divine reality. Academic theories, academic departments, and academic publications 
can offer much to our better understanding of God’s will and reign, but they do nothing 
to change divine reality. To God’s will and reign we are free, if freedom is simply 
defined as the ability to select between choices, to disregard or disagree with the notion 
or reality of God’s existence and kingship, but for those of us who are Christians, we are 
bound to the necessity of discerning God’s will and laws, and bound to the necessity of 
acquiescing to them. But allow me to insert one important detail; all of what I have so far 
said about religious freedom and the reign of God must be understood in consideration of 
the cornerstone of all God’s laws – mercy. In the Epistle of James we read this critical 
assertion: “So speak and so act as people who will be judged by the law of freedom. For 
the judgment is merciless to one who has not shown mercy; mercy triumphs over 
judgment.”36 Here is a typical Christian belief that amuses the theorists of the so-called 
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“linguistic turn.” Scripture speaks here of the “law of freedom.” And paradoxically, 
God’s judgment shall show no mercy to those who show no mercy. But for Christians, 
this is precisely kind of apparent contradiction that makes perfect sense. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Such apparent contradictions remind me of Zhuangzi’s dream, and the enduring 
challenges of mitigating between freedom and kingship. China is a strong example of an 
intellectual view in our present historical context that places the rights of political 
contingencies above the rights of a divine reign. Christians, I suggest, should not concede 
to the reign of anything other than the will of God, but Christian intellectuals must also 
admit the philosophical challenges of consensus. I’m optimistic that we can make 
progress toward working this problem out, but we must resist the anti-intellectual laziness 
that prefers entertainment to rigorous thought. I’ll end here with references to two 
Christian intellectuals, G. K. Chesterton (1874-1936) and William James 1842-1910). In 
his work, Heretics, Chesterton wrote this: 
There are some people – and I am one of them – who think that the most practical 
and important thing about a man is still his view of the universe. We think that for 
a landlady considering a lodger, it is important to know his income, but still more 
important to know his philosophy. We think that for a general about to fight an 
enemy, it is important to know the enemy’s numbers, but still more important to 
know the enemy’s philosophy. We think the question is not whether the theory of 
the cosmos affects matters, but whether, in the long run, anything else affects 
them.37 
Each one of us in this room has a philosophy, a view of the cosmos, and our views 
influence how we think and behave. Whether we view matters as did Rousseau, or 
whether we are influenced by Aristotle, Jacques Derrida, or Jesus Christ, we are what we 
think. And in increasingly obvious ways, we are also subject to what governments and 
universities think. But what of what God thinks?  
In a lecture by William James entitled, “What Pragmatism Means,” he reflects on 
a discussion he had with others while camping in the mountains. A dispute centered an 
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imagined scene: 
[A] live squirrel supposed to be clinging to one side of a tree trunk, while over 
against the tree’s opposite side a human being was imagined to stand. This human 
witness tries to get sight of the squirrel by moving rapidly round the tree, but no 
matter how fast he goes, the squirrel moves as fast in the opposite direction, and 
always keeps the tree between himself and the man, so that never a glimpse of 
him [the squirrel] is caught.38 
The metaphysical problem is this: does the man ever actually go around the squirrel or 
does he only go around the tree? In the end, there were no agreements; the answer was 
too elusive. Is knowing God’s will like attempting to catch sight of the squirrel in James’ 
allegory, or has God helped us know his laws in revealed scripture and the faculties of 
our created and creative intelligence? 
I’ll end with what I am really attempting to say. I am concerned that Rousseau’s 
ideas have not only created a new secular notion that how we are to behave is subject to 
majority vote or the vicissitudes of feelings, whether majority opinions or shifting 
sentiments are right or wrong, has also inflicted Christians with the same views and 
behaviors. Have we forgotten what God has willed for his creation? We may be free to 
believe what we wish, but are then truly free? Have we constructed intellectual paradigms 
that have inserted us into Zhuangzi’s dream, uncertain whether truth is what we create, or 
whether it is what we must obey? Mao Zedong (1893-1976) famously said once that, 
“Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” Without a genuine surrender to reign 
of God, I wonder if Mao’s assertion is the only reality to which humanity will default, or 
can we, if we are willing, surrender to a better reality, one that requires obedience to laws 
that challenge our present culture?
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